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Nodo unitatis et caritatis: 
The Structure and Argument of Augustine's 
De doctrina Christiana 
Walter A Hannam 
M u c h work has been done in the last half-century to shed some light upon the his-
torical background of (and the intellectual motivation for) St Augustine's composi-
tion of his great hermeneutical treatise the De doctrina Christiana-1 Li particular, the 
reason for the work's interruption and its subsequent completion some thirty years 
later has been the subject of some debatE. Perhaps die most useful examination of 
this problem, as well as the most convincing conclusion, is found in the essay by 
Charles Kannengiesser, "The Interrupted De doctrina Christianaa paper delivered at 
the international colloquium entitled "De doctrina Christiana: A Classic of Western 
Culture" held at the University of Notre Dame in 1991.2 Professor Kannengiesser 
argues that the interruption of the De doctrina Christiana was a direct result of a con-
fusion in Augustine's own hermeneutic, precipitated by his investigation of the 
hermeneutic of the Donatist Tychonius (whose Liber re/jularis Augustine examines in 
the conclusion to book III of De doctrina Christiana, under the title of Liber refftt-
larum). While this insightful and important article postulates answers to many ques-
tions about the Bishop of Hippo's intellectual motivation, both for the interruption 
of his work and for its resumption, it implicidy raises a further question of no litde 
significance—namely, given the interruption of the work and Augustine's personal 
intellectual development in the intervening years between its interruption and com-
pletion, does the De doctrina Christiana present a unified argument or a coherent 
philosophical understanding of die work of doctrina ? For the purposes of this paper 
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historical references will be secondary, as I will examine the De doctrina Christiana 
solely in terms of its structure and argument, as well as its place in the Augustin ian 
philosophy of which it is a part. 
It is necessary first to show the place which Scripture holds in Augustine's 
philosophy as a whole. In his paper "In Aenigmate Trinkas: The Conversion of 
Philosophy in St Augustine's Confessions," Robert Crouse explains that: 
By the prompting of the Word externally, the soul is recalled to find and 
recognise the truth within, in domicüio coßitationis. Thus, the conversion of 
the soul proceeds in dialogue between the Word without, and the same 
Word within; and that is why the Confessions, and, in general, the Augustin-
ian philosophy which follows from it, must have the form of engagement 
with the Word of God in Scripture (p. 59). 
It will be remembered that Augustine makes this identification of the sapientia of the 
Divine Word now incarnate and the sapientia found in Holy Scripture in Confessiones 
XI, ii when he entreats divine assistance in his exegesis of the first Genesis creation 
narrative: 
obsecro per dominum nostrum Iesum Christum filium tuum, virum dex-
terae tuae, filium hominis, quem confirmasti tibi mediatorem tuum et nos-
trum, per quem nos quaesisti non quaerentes te, quaesisti autem, ut 
quaereremus te, verbum tuum, per quod fecisti omnia ... per eum te obse-
cro ... in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi. ipsos 
quaero in libris tuis (Confessiones XI, ii, p. 214). 
[I beseech you, through our Lord Jesus Christ your Son, the man at your 
right hand, whom you set as a mediator, yours and ours, through whom 
you sought us who were not seeking you; moreover, you sought us so that 
we might seek you, your Word, through whom you made all things ... 
through Him I beseech you ... in whom all the treasures of Wisdom and 
knowledge are hidden. These same treasures I seek in your books.] 
These same treasures I seek in your books." Augustine's discovery of the word made 
flesh—the conjunction in Christ of the temporal and spiritual—has allowed him to 
find in the externa] words of scripture, written by human hands, the secrets of the 
true word and wisdom of God, which he can receive and recognise intus through the 
Walter A. Hannam 147 
word uttered within his own soul.3 For Augustine, the verba of scripture were a 
means of turning the mind inwards upon itself, to where Christ the inner teacher 
dwells, in whom is all truth. Thus, Audiat te intus sermocinantem qui potest, "Let him 
who is able hear you, you who speak interiorly," Augustine proclaims (Confessiones 
XI, ix, p. 228). The truth has revealed himself to humanity in scripture and is, at the 
same dme, the "inner teacher" of our minds. As a result, Chrisdan philosophy must 
be a conversw from the outward images found in scripture to the truth ever present to 
the mind through Christ. This process necessarily begins with scriptural images 
(uttered fbris and, as such, external to the soul); as these images are interiorised and 
given content by Christ, the inner teacher, the rational soul begins finally to under-
stand (intdleqere) truth, now appropriated within the mind itself. The conversio (turn-
ing and returning) of the soul which constitutes Augustinian philosophy takes place 
in several distinct stages. The soul, under die guidance of grace, "recalls itself from 
the external to the internal, from the lower to the higher" ab exterioribus ad interiora, 
ab infbrioribus ad superiora (Enarratio in Ps. CXLV.5). This process can be described 
quickly as a movement of fides quaerens intellectum, in which the mind seeks to 
appropriate the images of scripture, making them accessible to ratio "reason" and 
intellectus "understanding."4 
Augustine's philosophical method, which underlies the structure not only of the 
De doctrina Christiana but also of such works as the Confessiones and the De trinitate, is 
clearly adumbrated in De doctrina Christiana II, vii when Augustine expounds the seven 
jfradus or "steps" by which one ascends to wisdom. The first twogradus—namely timor 
Dei "fear of God" and pietas "piety" in the face of scripture—are presupposed in the 
reader to whom the De doctrina Christiana is addressed.5 Had Augustine's readers not 
ascended these first twogradus, they could in no way be the students of the scriptures 
whom Augustine addresses in the Prooemium {Prooemium, 1). The next three jfradus 
enumerated are of central importance to this work; indeed, it is these three stages in 
Augustine's method—namely scientia scripturarum "knowledge of the scriptures," 
firtitudo "courage," and consilium misericordiae "the counsel of mercy"—which the De 
doctrina Christiana spans. The first of these jjradus, scientia scripturarum, is a basic and 
external knowledge of the images of scripture (the res continentes fidem with which 
Augustine deals in De doctrina Christiana, book I).6 This scientia, as will be explained 
more fully below, is the content of the (at first external) faith which is the first step in 
the Augustinian philosophical method of faith seeking understanding, fides quaerens 
intellectum. The nextjjradus explains the beginning of the movement ad intellectum? 
In this fourthgradus, one sees the familiar pattern emerging, by which the human soul 
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possessing faith in its scientia scripturarum seeks its intettectusfidei—namely, by turning 
ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab infèrioribus ad superiora. This will be seen to be exactly 
the pattern of books II and III of the De doctrina Christiana. The fifth /jradus (concilium 
misericordiae) corresponds to what is explained in De doctrina Christiana book IV. 
Before turning to comment on the structure of the De doctrina Christiana as a 
whole, however, it is necessary to oudine briefly the broad implications of the final 
four jjradus in general. The fourth and fifthßradus, I argue, ought not to be seen as 
steps in an hierarchical sense, but rather in a logical sense. They are, in truth, the two 
moments in the conversio ad intellectum fidei which has been examined above. The 
fourth step is the intellective moment of the ascent, die fifth is the affective moment, 
consisting in love of neighbour as a moment in God's divine love which effects the 
conversio of all creation back to Himself (affective love for God is always prior, however, 
and thus, as one enters a deeper understanding of the res fidei, one realises that the 
neighbour can only be loved for God's sake). In fact, the sixthßradus is the activity of 
intellectual conversio as a whole, of which these preceding qradus are necessary and 
correlative moments. In the sixth step, as Augustine explains, one 
ipsum oculum purgat, quo videri deus potest... in hoc autem gradu ita pur-
gat oculum cordis, ut veritati ne ipsum quidem praeferat aut conférât prox-
imum, ergo nec se ipsum, quia nec ilium, quem diligit sicut se ipsum (Π, 
vn, 11). 
[purifies the eye itself by which God can be seen ... Moreover, in this step 
(qradus) one so purifies the eye of the heart, that one neither favours nor 
compares even one's neighbour to the Truth; therefore, neither does one 
favour nor compare oneself to the Truth, because this one will not even do 
for the person whom one loves as oneself] 
The content of Christian fides has both an intellective and a moral content. There-
fore, the movement ad intellectum fidei must have both an intellective (oculus quo 
videri deus potest) and an affective (oculus cordis) moment. These moments are seen in 
steps four and five. In step four, one comes to understand the res fidei "realities of the 
faith." This intellective aspect of the faith consists principally of the Trinity and the 
incarnation, and secondarily of creation's descent from and return to God through 
providence. The res fidei are the principles of the moral aspect of the faith. In other 
words, as diese realities (that is, first, the Trinity, the divine self-love, and second, 
providence and the incarnation, expressions of divine love for creation) become 
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more fully understood as true, they are necessarily affectively sought as good, and 
one must, as it were, "act out the faith," in proclaiming the inteUecta to one's neigh-
bour in word and deed (step five). This activity is itself a moment of the conversio of 
all intellective natures (and indeed of all creation) back to God through Christ. This 
twofold activity, ruled over by, and done for the sake of, God, is the activity by 
which the Christian philosopher attains the full intellcctus fidei. The seventhgradus, 
sapientia, I argue, is not attained fully in this life, but only in the unending perfruen-
dum of the Trinity in eternity.8 The life of the Christian doctor is summed up in the 
activity of the sixth gradus with its two constitutive moments, the fourth and fifth 
gradus. 
This structure of the De doctrina Christiana will become clear as we examine the 
work itself more closely. Returning to the beginning of the work, it is necessary first 
to examine briefly the Prooemium, which is important, not simply as a polemic against 
possible objectors, but as a philosophical underpinning upon the understanding of 
which the entire method of the work depends.9 The argument in this section takes the 
form of an aporia and argues, at once, against those who are wanting in divine grace, 
and hence, attempt to understand scripture solely through human teaching, and against 
those who believe totum quod de Warum litterarum obscuritatihus laudibiliter aperitur, 
divino munere fieri posse "that everything about the obscurities of Scripture which is 
uncovered in a praiseworthy manner can be done simply by divine gift" (Prooemium, 
2). Both of these classes of reader suffer from the sin of pride, superbia: the first class 
is too proud to ask for divine assistance and the second too proud to accept the 
assistance given by God through human activity—namely, the work of doctrina 
Christiana in the church. What neither of these classes of objectors has accepted are the 
full consequences of the incarnation; that is, they have not accepted the connection of 
the material and spiritual worlds which at once allows human beings to receive divine 
assistance through grace, and allows God to act through human agents.10 It is precisely 
as members of Christ's body (that is, as members of the church—an institution which 
is, at least partly, human) that people are redeemed; this redemption comes about, 
however, not only through human agency, but by the agency of the divine in the world. 
As Augustine says: 
Nam omne verum ab illo est, qui ait: Ego sum Veritas. Quid enim habe-
mus, quod non accepimus? Quod si accepimus, quid gloriamur quasi non 
acceperimus (Prooetnium, 8). 
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fFor every truth (verum) is from Him who said: MI am the Truth" (John 14: 
6). For what do we have which we have not received? If we have received 
these things, why do we glory as though we have not received them? (cf. 1 
Cor 4: 7).] 
Having once accepted the full consequences of the incarnation, Augustine's reader is 
ready to proceed to the argument of the De doctrina Christiana itself. Augustine opens 
the body of his treatise with a very important distinction, upon which, he says, all 
treatment of Scripture depends: the modus inveniendi quae intelle/jenda sunt and the 
modus proferendi quae intellecta sunt—the way of finding those things which must be 
understood, and the way of making known those things which have been under-
stood (I, i, 1). To the first of these, Augustine dedicates books I through ΙΠ and to 
the second, book IV. Before Augustine begins to explain these two processes, how-
ever, he quickly examines the necessary nature of an act of love performed through 
God's grace. Such an act cannot remain internal but must turn outside of the human 
self as an expression of love: Omnis enim res, quae dando non deficit, dum habetur et 
non datur, nondum habetur, quomodo habenda est "For every thing (res) which is not 
reduced by being given away, so long as it is possessed and not given, is not yet pos-
sessed as it ought" (I, i, 1). This is, of course, the very nature of love: as St Paul 
expresses it, love non quaerit quae sua sunt "seeketh not her own" (1 Cor 13: 5). This 
will become important when we come to examine how it is that the modus proferendi 
arises naturally out of the intellecta. 
Augustine next divides the modus inveniendi into two aspects—the study of 
realities and signs (the famous res/si/jna distinction of book I). Book I becomes 
Augustine's Liber de rebus continentibus fidem and in books II and III he deals with 
siffna. It is necessary to see, however, what sense can be made out of this division in 
terms of my earlier assertion that the De doctrina Christiana runs along the lines of steps 
three through six of book II, chapter vii. A fundamental distinction must be borne in 
mind, a distinction less apparent than those already discussed, which Augustine 
maintains throughout the De doctrina Christiana—namely, the distinction between 
scientia and intellectus. To know something (scire or nosse) is not the same thing as to 
understand it. Although English is very loose in its use of these words, even, at times 
to the point of synonymy, die Latin is explicit and precise: the verbs scire and nosse 
connote an acquaintance with something—knowledge in the most external sense. 
Intellegere, on the other hand, connotes knowledge which has become interior to the 
mind itself—understanding in its fullest sense. Scientia, therefore, is simply the 
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knowledge that something is so. Intellectus, on the other hand, is the understanding 
of why and how it is so, demonstrated through necessary reasons. For example, 
Augustine says in book II, chapter ix, that the first step ad sapientiam is "to know (nasse) 
these books, even if not yet to the point of understanding (etsi nondum ad intellectum)" 
(Π, ix, 14). Moreover, in this step, 
ilia, quae in eis ape rte posita sunt, vel praecepta vivendi vel regulae c re-
dend i, solertius diligentiusque investiganda sunt... In his enim, quae a perte 
in scripturis posita sunt, inveniuntur ilia omnia, quae continent fîdem mor-
esque vivendi, spem scilicet atque caritatem, de quibus libro superiore 
[book I] tractavimus (II, ix, 14). 
[those concepts which are stated clearly in these books, whether precepts of 
living or rules of believing, ought to be more skilfully and more diligendy 
investigated ... For in those passages which are stated openly in the Scrip-
tures are found all those things which contain faith and the morals of living 
(namely, hope and charity) about which we treated in the preceding book.] 
V 
Thus we begin to see where the first book—the liber de rebus continentibus fidem—fits 
into Augustine's schema. This is the book in which he deals with scienda: those 
things with which the Christian doctor must first become acquainted in fide. It is 
important to note here how Augustine maintains the two aspects of Christian fides— 
namely, intellective and moral (fidem moresque vivendi), which were noted earlier in 
the examination of steps (jjradus) four through six. At this point in the argument the 
exegete develops a régula fidei—that is, a set of credenda (containing both intellective 
and moral aspects) which must be first believed, as Augustine makes most clear later: 
consulat regulam fidei, quam de scripturarum planioribus locis et ecclesiae 
auctoritate percepit, de qua satis egimus, cum de rebus in libro primo 
loqueremur (ΠΙ, ii, 2). 
[let him consult the rule of faith (régula fidei) which he gathered from the 
plainer passages of the Scriptures and from the authority of the Church, 
which we discussed enough when we spoke about realities (de rebus) in the 
first book.] 
We begin to see here a familiar pattern developing—the Augustinian pattern of fides 
quaerens intellectum, the dialogue of the word without with the Word within, which 
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was spoken of earlier in this paper. But what is the content of this fides in rebus which 
is acquired in book I? In brief, we learn of God who is immaterial, ineffable, and tri-
une. In a traditional Christian/Neoplatonic pattern of exitus/reditus, we realise that 
we are pereqrinantes a domino and yet, as a result of the incarnation, we are able to use 
(uti) creation in order to attain to and enjoy (frui/amore inhaerere propter se ipsum) 
God, Wisdom itself.11 Moreover, we learn the proper ordering of our loves of God 
and neighbour: that is to say, we are to love God for His own sake, and our neigh-
bour for God's sake—as fellow rational natures and fellow travellers on the via ad 
patriam. We must believe this, but, fiirther we must hope for the accomplishment of 
our redemption and return to God:12 
Porro si et credit et diligit, bene agendo et praeceptis morum bonorum 
obtemperando efficit, ut etiam speret se ad id, quod diligit, esse venturum 
(I, xxxvii, 41). 
[Further, if one both believes and loves, by acting well and obeying the pre-
cepts of good morals, one acts so as indeed to hope that one should arrive 
at that which one loves.] 
But, as Augustine explains, "the knowledge of a good hope does not make one vaunt 
oneself, but makes one lament" (II, vii, 10). This state leads one to implore divine 
assistance by which, Augustine tells us, one reaches the fourth gradus—firrtitudo : 
Hoc enim affectu ab omni mortifera iucunditate rerum transeuntium sese 
extrahit et inde se avertens convertit ad dilectionem aeternorum, incummu-
tabilem scilicet unitatem eandemque trinitatem (Ü, vii, 10). 
[For with this affection, one disentangles oneself from every deadly plea-
sure of transitory realities (res) and, averting oneself from these, turns (con-
vertit) to the love of eternal realities, to wit, the immutable unity which is, 
at the same time, Trinity.] 
We see in this moment die familiar Augustinian pattern by which the human soul 
possessing faith seeks its intettectus ßdei—namely, by turning ab exterioribus ad inte-
riora, ab inferioribus ad superiora. And this is exacdy the pattern we discover in books 
Π and III, when Augustine comes to explain the means of uncovering the meanings 
of the signa of scripture. 
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After book II, chapter ix, in which Augustine concludes his explication of scientia, 
he explains: duabus ... causts non intelleguntur, quae scripta sunt, si out ignotis aut 
ambiguis syjnis obteguntur "Things which are written are not understood (non 
intellequntur) for two reasons—namely, if they are veiled under either (i) unknown or 
(ii) ambiguous signs" (II, x, 15). These siqna he further subdivides into signa propria 
and signa translata (proper and figurative signs). In book II, Augustine deals with 
ignota signa (first proper and then figurative). Ignota signa, in general, are signs which 
in their immediate form are inaccessible to the intellect; that is to say, the signum (in 
this case the written word of scripture) is not understood because it is somehow 
inhibited from being absorbed by the intellect—it remains external and is not able to 
be grasped interiorly. The process by which ignota signa are made accessible to the 
intellect is a movement ab exterioribus ad interiora—it is the process of grasping 
interiorly the verbum quod sonuit forts. 
Augustine begins his discussion of ignota signa with an examination of ignota signa 
propria. The inaccessibility of "proper signs" to the intellect results from not knowing 
for what res a signum properly stands. Since we are dealing here with scriptural signs, 
the signa in question are words, or groups of words, in human language. The 
inaccessibility of verba is at first the result of not being familiar with the language in 
which scripture is written: therefore, fcjontra ignota signa propria magnum remedium 
est linguarum cofjnitio "a knowledge (cognitio) of languages is a great remedy against 
unknown proper signs" (II, xi, 16). The cognitio linguarum is the first means through 
which human intellect can have access to a scriptural text; without this primary cognitio 
the realities of which the word of scripture speaks must remain utterly forts. Ignota 
signa propria can be more fully apprehended through the comparison of various 
translations, by learning their relative accuracy and the regard in which each is held by 
the church. 
When Augustine moves on to explain ignota signa translata, we begin to see his 
method even more clearly. He states that these signs can be understood partim 
linguarum noHtiaparim rerum "partly by a knowledge (notifia) of languages, partly by 
a knowledge of things (res or realities)" (II, xvi, 23). Signa translata, since they are 
signs which have secondary significations connoting something other than those 
things which are indicated by the signs' primary significations, can either be ignota 
because the symbolic connotations given certain words in certain languages can escape 
us, or because the nature of the thing primarily signified by the translatum signum is 
not known. Again, die study of language is a more or less external study—a scientia 
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of external language and its connotations. In the study of things, however, there is a 
most definite movement ab exterioribus ad interiora. Augustine explains that in the 
study of things (res), duo sunt genera doctrinarum "there are two sorts of doctrinarum 
or learning" (II, xix, 29). Of these doctrinae, one sort teaches of things instituted by 
humans, the other of things instituted by God. Some things instituted by humans are 
superstitious and others not. The knowledge of superstitious institutions is useless to 
the Christian exegete because it deals with unrealities: that is to say, it treats the created 
order as if it were itself divine—an absolute denial of truth and an aversio from God, 
Ipsa Veritas. Of those human institutions which are not superstitious, one ought to 
avoid those which are superfluous, since they lead to an inordinate love of the created 
order as opposed to the proper love of creation in relation to God. Human forms of 
learning (doctrinae), however, quae ad usum vitae necessarium proficiunt, nequaquam est 
facienda christiano "which help with the necessities of life, by no means ought to be 
avoided by the Christian" (II, xxv, 40). 
A knowledge of all institutions put in place by God, however, is useful for the 
Christian since it can be an exegetical aid: it must, however, be seen as such by the 
person using it so that it might be used in the right way. These sciences are enumerated 
in the order of their increasing intériorisation in the human person. The first two, 
Augustine tells us, pertain to the bodily senses, ad sensus corporis. History is the study 
of past events which in ordine temporum habenda sunt, quorum est conditor et 
administrator deus "are situated in the order of time, of which God is both creator and 
administrator" (II, xxviii, 44). Because history studies these events simply as events, 
however, it is basically empirical, dealing with external objects. Natural science, as 
well, is simply an empirical science which studies the order of things as they are—the 
study, in other words, of the order of creation as instituted by God. Of the arts (which 
deal with realities made by humans) and games or play (which are activities done for 
their own sake) Augustine bids us attain a cursory knowledge, ne omnino nesciamus 
quid scriptum velit insinuate, cum de his artibus aliquas figuratas locutiones inscrit "lest we 
should be altogether ignorant of what Scripture wishes to recommend when it 
introduces certain figurative expressions concerning these arts" (II, xxx, 47). What 
must be borne in mind about these doctrinae is that their objects, although intelligible 
because created by God, as corporeal always remain in a certain sense external to the 
mind. 
In chapter xxxi, however, we begin to move truly ad interiora, for the last group 
of divine institutions which Augustine investigates are not only instituted by God, but 
Walter A. Hannam 155 
pertain to the soul's reason, ad rationem anxmi. The laws of logic and number, and 
most especially the objects of Platonic philosoohy, are truly interior to the human 
mind, the highest point of our human nature.13 Indeed, it is by means of the eternal 
laws of reason, the faculty which deals with all of these doctrinae, that the mind is 
enabled to turn intus in order to allow the word spoken externally to resonate with 
the Word eternally present to, although above, the human soul. Exactly how this stage 
of the ascent to wisdom operates is seen most clearly in the De trinitate. Having 
oudined the requla fidei in books I-IV of De trinitate, Augustine sets up the road of 
ascent by investigating the universal category of relation which is at work within his 
own soul, in order that the word spoken firis and received in faith might become 
interiorised and that the soul might tend from this intériorisation of the word ad 
superiora, which is exacdy the process described in De doctrina Christiana book ΙΠ. 
If book II of the De doctrina Christiana equips the Christian doctor with the tools 
which allow a turning ah exterioribus ad interiora, book ΙΠ explains the process by 
which one's knowledge of the now-interiorised scriptural siqna can move ab inferioribus 
ad superiora. This book, which deals with signa ambigua, is at the first level concerned 
with the mind's ability to deal with ambiguities of speech in such a way that no mere 
literal meaning (in the modern, not Augustinian, sense) is gleaned from the passages 
investigated. Augustine explains: Neque ullamorsanimae congruentiusappellatur, quant 
cum id etiam, quod in ea bestiis antecellit, hoc est, intellegentia carni subicitur sequendo 
litteram "Neither is anything more fittingly called the death of the soul than when that 
which in it indeed distinguishes it as being above the lower animals—that is, the 
understanding, intellegentia—is subjected to the flesh by following the letter" (HI, v, 
9). The structure of this book again moves from that which is most external, namely 
the ambiguities of punctuation in signa propria ambigua (which are cleared up by means 
of pointing the external text in such a way as not to disagree with the régula fidei), to 
the more internal—that is, to the ambiguities of signa translata ambigua, whose 
difficulties are cleared up within the mind itself. When these difficulties have been 
cleared and the mind has ascertained the spiritual (non-corporeal or interior) meaning 
at its highest point, then the mind, indeed, ab omni tnortifera iucunditate rerum 
transeuntium sese extrahit et inde se avertens convertit ad dilectionem aeternorum, 
incummutabiletn scilicet unitatem eandemque trinitatem "disentangles itself from every 
deadly pleasure of transitory realities, and, averting itself from these, turns to the love 
of eternal realities, to wit, to the immutable unity which is, at the same time, Trinity" 
(II, vii, 10), as Augustine explained in the fourthgradus. 
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Augustine concludes book ΠΙ by stating that: 
non solum admonendi sunt studiosi venerabilium litterarum, ut in scrip-
turis sanctis genera locution urn sciant, et quomodo apud eas dici aliquid 
soleat, vigilanter advertant memoriterque retineant, verum etiam, quod est 
praecipuum et maxime necessarium, orent, ut intellegant (III, xxxvii, 56). 
f Students of the Venerable Letters ought to be counselled, not only so that 
they might know the varieties of expression in the Holy Scriptures and vigi-
landy direct their attention and hold in their minds how things arc custom-
arily said in them, but also, that which is especially and most of all 
necessary, so that they might pray in order that they might understand. \ 
This is to say, when the realities, res, of fides are studied in die way described above, 
they become the realities of intellectus. The human mind investigating scripture must 
move ab exterioribus ad interiora per scientiam ad superiora. The fides of book I seeks 
and finds its intellectus by the methods set down in books II and III. The word spo-
ken forts resonates in dialogue with the Word held intus as faith is proven by true and 
necessary reasons. This exegetica! and theological method is found most fully devel-
oped in the De trinitate, in which Augustine moves from the requla fidei of books I-
IV, through the eternal and interior categories in books V-VII, and finally ascends 
ad intellectum by ascending to a true spiritual (non-corporeal) meaning of the resfidei 
by means of the "images" of the final books.14 
But how, it may be asked, does the fourth and final book of the De doctrina 
Christiana fit into this ordering of things? I argue that it corresponds to the fifth qradus 
of book Π—the consilium misericordiae in which, Augustine says, one in dilectione 
proxùni naviter exercet "is occupied entirely in the love of neighbour" (II, vii, 11). This 
point clears up the vague introduction to the work of exegesis given by Augustine in 
I, i. Remember Augustine's admonition that omnis... res, quae dando non deficit, dum 
habetur et non datur, nondum habetur, quomodo habenda est "every thing, res, which is 
not reduced by being given away, so long as it is possessed and not given, is not yet 
possessed as it ought" (I, i, 1). The Christian doctor, if the realities of Scripture have 
been properly learned intus, will naturally follow the order of love found there—that 
is, to love God for His own sake and the neighbour for God's sake. This necessarily 
entails a sharing of the truth learned: "this is my hope, therefore I speak," says 
Augustine in his Confessiones (X, i) : the intellectual discovery of the truth of divine love 
and affective participation in it (die turning to God for His own sake) necessitate the 
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turning outward from the self to one's neighbour in love (for God's sake), a love which 
desires the salvation of all people. 
Augustine's last book is about the consilium misericordiae, the love bestowed by 
the Holy Spirit which unites die church on earth. He is not writing a Uberderhetorica, 
as he tells us in IV, i. If book IV is examined carefully, it becomes apparent that, 
although the Christian orator is allowed to study the art of rhetoric, the principal duty 
is to expound the truths of scripture in plain terms understandable by the people. 
Moreover, the truth of scripture itself will be the real force behind the Christian 
teacher's delivery. Further, it is also made clear, as Augustine explained in the beginning 
of the De doctrina Christiana, that the entire work of doctrina, theological exegesis, and 
Christian teaching, depends upon the work of grace. The teacher can do nothing in 
preaching but expound the simple truths clearly and in a spirit of Christian love. A 
teacher cannot force people into faith, for faith is effected by grace alone working in 
the human soul. Therefore, the preacher will succeed: pietate mqjjis orationum quant 
oratorum jacultate "more by the piety of prayers than by the faculty of the orator" (IV, 
xv, 32). 
The structure of the argument of Augustine's De doctrina Christiana is clear. The 
structure is one of conversio and confessio. The first three books constitute the movement 
of conversio as fides moves per scientiarn ad intellectum, the soul moving through the 
methods of book Π ab exterioribus ad interiora and by the methods of book ΙΠ ab 
inferioribus ad superiora. In this structure, which Augustine obviously intended from 
the outset of his work (as can be seen in his description of his intended treatise in book 
I, chapter i and from the structure of the books completed before 397), is prefigured 
the structure of all of Augustine's most important works including, especially, the 
Confessiones and the De trinitate. Moreover, this coherent argument of conversio fidei 
ad intellectum and confessio coram multis testibus15 sets the stage for die entire medieval 
Augustinian tradition including, though not exclusive to, such philosophical 




1 A shorter version of this paper was presented at a joint colloquium of the 
Canadian Society of Patristic Studies, the Canadian Society of Medievalists, and the 
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Canadian Society for Renaissance Studies at the Learned Societies Conference held 
at Brock University, St Catharines, Ontario, in June 1996 while I was a graduate stu-
dent in the Department of Classics at Dalhousie University. Financial support for my 
attendance at the conference was provided by Dalhousie, and for the completion of 
this paper by the trustees of the Killam Memorial Trusts and Dalhousie. Unless oth-
erwise indicated, quotations are from the Dc doctrina Christiana, and all translations 
are my own. 
2 Professor Kannengiesser argues that Augustine's interruption of De doctrina 
Christiana was the result of his confusion over the enterprise of Tychonius Afer in the 
Liber regularis. Augustine in 396, "still infused with the allegiance to the Platonizing 
high culture which he had enjoyed so much in Milan" had "failed to grasp the signifi-
cance of Tychonius's enterprise." (pp. 7-8). This explanation of the interruption of 
the De doctrina Christiana stands in marked contrast to that of E. Hill, who argues 
that Augustine was engaged in the writing of a hermeneutical manual at the request 
of his primate, Aurelius of Carthage. In Hill's opinion, Augustine was not conscious 
of any lack of understanding on his part of Tychonius' Liber regularis, but, on the 
contrary, feared using the work of a known Donatist without his primate's permis-
sion. The interruption can, therefore, be explained, for Hill, by saying that "perhaps 
Aurelius never answered, or perhaps he decided against Tychonius for the time 
being" (p. 445). Both Kannengiesser's and Hill's theories hinge upon the interpreta-
tion of Augustine's Epistula XLI: Nam et ego quod iussisti rum negligo et de Tyconti sep-
tern regulis vel clavibus sicut saepe iam scripsi cognoscere quid tibi videatur expecto. 
Kannengiesser argues that Augustine had written Aurelius for clarification, while 
Hill opines that Augustine had rather written for Aurelius' permission to use Tycho-
nius. The answer to this question can only be resolved, as Professor Kannengiesser 
has righdy explained to me in several conversations, by investigating how August-
ine's own exegetical method changed throughout his life and by showing how much 
this change was influenced by African exegetical methods such as that of Tychonius. 
3 Cf. Confessiones, XL, viii: ipsum est verbum tuum, quod et principium est, et loqui-
tur nobis, sic in evanpfelio per carnem ait, et hoc insonuit finis auribus hominum, ut cred-
eretur et intus quamretur, et inveniretur in aeterna veritate, ubi omnes discipulos bonus et 
solus magister docet This is your Word, which is the Principle, and speaks in us. Thus 
He spoke in the Gospel through the flesh, and this sounded externally (forts) in the 
ears of the hearers, so that they might believe and seek interiorly (intus), and find the 
Eternal Truth, where the One and Good Teacher teaches all fHisl disciples." This 
understanding of the "Inner Teacher" had been clear to Augustine as early as his 
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composition of the De mofjistro. Adeodatus responds: utrum autem vera dicantur, 
eurn docere solum, qui se intus habitare, cum fbris loqueretur, admonuit, quern iamfavente 
ipso tanto ardentiusdiligam, quanto ero in discendo pwvectior "[I have learned that] ... 
whether true things are spoken, He alone teaches, who, although he speaks exter-
nally (forts) Λ reminds us that he dwells interiorly (intus); now, by His help, may I 
love Him more ardendy, the more I advance in learning" (De maqistro, xiv, 46). 
4 The movement of this conversio mentis begins necessarily with faith (fides), 
since it is only in this mode that the words of scripture, as external image, are initially 
accessible to human cognition. The movement ad interiora is a process in which the 
images of scripture, which qua image are inaccessible to reason, are given a content 
which can be grasped by the mind rationalster. That is to say, the images of scripture 
are given a form which is accessible to human reason, a form in which human scientia 
is able to grasp them and to move discursively, rationalster, to an understanding of 
them, intellectus. This process is not instantaneous, however, nor will all truths neces-
sarily be grasped by the intellect; fides, therefore, remains an important aspect and 
cannot be dispensed with in this life. Although the images have been given a content 
which can be grasped by reason, nevertheless they are still at this stage only poten-
tially understood. Augustine, therefore, warns the philosopher: si intellectu capi non 
potest, fide teneatur donee inlucescat in cordibus tile qui ait per prophetam: Nisi credideritis 
non intelleqetis "if it is not able to be grasped by the intellect, let it be held in faith 
until He chines in our hearts, who said through the Prophet: "Unless you will 
believe, you will not understand (Isa 7: 9)" (De trinitate, VII, vi, 12). The most 
obvious example of this portion of the philosophical movement (the movements 
interiora) in die Augustinian corpus is, perhaps, found in books V-VII of the De trin-
itate: it is also seen, however, in Confessiones, X. Cf. Crouse, "St Augustine's De trini-
tate* p. 508, and also Crouse, "Recurrens in te unum : The Pattern of St Augustine's 
Confessions" where it is argued that: "In no way arbitrary or accidental, the structure 
of the Confessions is the precise literary embodiment of St Augustine's Itinemrium 
[mentis in Deum] : ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora,n (p. 392). 
See also on this point in the Confessions, Crouse, "In Multa Defluximus: Confessions X, 
29-43," who suggests: "Book X of the Confessions, where St Augustine turns ab exteri-
onbus ad interiora, and prepares for the ascent ad superiora in the final three books, 
forms the logical centre of the argument" (p. 182). Finally, having rendered the 
images of scripture in a form accessible to the mind, the philosopher prepares for his 
ascent within his own soul, ab inferioribus ad superiora. Augustine describes this 
ascent in the De tnnitate: tendmusper scientiam ad sapientiam (ΧΠΙ, xix, 24). That is 
to say, through the exercise of discursive reason the human mind is elevated to 
160 Augustine's De doctrina Christiana 
understanding, an inteüectus which one achieves most fully in sapientia. This process 
can occur since, for Augustine, human reason has both an inferior sciential part 
which deals with externat, discursive objects which have been rendered intelligible, as 
well as a superior or sapiential part, in contact with the eternal reasons in the Verbum 
Dei itself, by which the truth of these objects is both known and judged. Cf. De trin-
itate, XII, ii, 2: Sed sublimions rationis est iudicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes 
incorporais et sempiternas quae nisi supra mentem humanem essent, incommutabiles pro-
fecto rum essent, atque his nisi subiungeretur aliquid nostrum, non secundum eas possemus 
de corporalibus iudicare. Iudicamus autem de corporalibus ex rationem dimensionum atque 
figurarum quam incommutabiliter manere mens novit "But it belongs to the higher rea-
son to judge concerning these corporeal things according to incorporeal and sem-
piternal reasons, which, except they were above the mind, would not be actually 
immutable; and unless something of ours were joined to these, we would not be 
capable of judging corporeal things according to these. Moreover, we judge corpo-
real things by reason of dimensions and figures, which the mind knows remain 
immutably." The images of scripture, once made accessible to reason, must be raised 
to the apex mentis through a continued intériorisation of the truth grasped in them. 
See the astute comment of David Hassel: "Scientia is, then, inferior to wisdom in the 
sense that it must subordinated cooperate with the latter if it is to achieve the good 
of the knower. This simply means that the higher and more interior part of man 
must exercise control if the sciential use of sensible things is to be ordained to a better 
and truer life." The understanding of the truth of scripture is, therefore, deepened as 
discursive reason, under the direction of the higher reason which is in direct contact 
with the rationessempiternae in the Verbum Dei, moves towards a fuller and more per-
fect intellectus. 
5 De doctrina Christiana, II, vii, 9: ante omnia igitur opus est dei timoré converti ad 
cognoscendum eius voluntatem, quid nobis appetendum fitgiendumque praecipiat. Timor 
autem iste cognitionem de nostra mortalitate et de futura morte necesse est incutiat et quasi 
clavatis carnibus omnes superbtae motus liffno crucis affyjat. Deinde mit esc ere opus est 
pietate neque contradicere divinae scripturae sive intellectae, si aliqua vitia nostra percu tit, 
sive non intellectae, quasi nos melius sapere meliusque praecipere possimus, sed cogitare 
potius et credere id esse melius et vertus, quod ibi scriptum est, etiam si lateat, quam id, 
quod nos per nos ipsos sapere possumus "Before all therefore, it is necessary to be con-
verted by the fear of God to knowing His Will—what He enjoins us to strive for and 
avoid. This fear must lead to thought of our own mortality and future death and, just 
as if our bodies had been nailed, it fixes all prideftil impulses (superbtae motus) to the 
wood of the Cross. Then it is necessary to become gentle through piety, and not to 
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contradict Holy Scripture, whether understood (if it strikes down certain of our 
vices) or not understood (as if we are able to discern or to enjoin a better way); but 
rather, it is necessary to understand and believe that what is there written is better 
and more true, even if it be hidden, than that which we are able to discern by our-
selves." 
6 De doctrina Christiana, II, vii, 10: ad tertium venitur scientiaegradum, de quo 
nunc öftere institut. Nam in eo se exercet omnis divinarum scripturarum studiosus, nihil in 
eis aliud inventurus quam diligendum esse deum propter deum et prvximum propter deum, 
et ilium quidem ex toto corde, ex tota anima, ex tota mente, proximum vero tamquam se 
ipsum, id est, ut tota proximi, sicut etiam nostri dilectio referatur in deum. De quibus duo-
bus praeceptis, cum de rebus ageremus, libro superiore tractavimus. Necesse est ergo, ut 
primo se quisque in scriptum inventât antore hu tus saeculi, hoc est temporalium rerum, 
implicatum, longe seiunctum esse a tanto antore dei et tanto amore proximi, quantum 
scriptura ipsa praescribit. Tum vero tile timor, quo coqitat de iudido dei, et ilia pietas, qua 
non potest nisi credere et cedere auctoritati sanctorum librorum, cofjit eum se ipsum lugere. 
Nam ista scientia bonae spei hominem non se iactantem, sed lamentantem facit "[next] 
one arrives at the third step (gradus), that of knowledge, which I have now begun to 
discuss. For in this step, every student of the Holy Scriptures works to find in them 
nothing else than that God ought to be loved with all the heart, with all the soul, and 
with all the mind, and that one's neighbour, indeed, ought to be loved as oneself— 
that is, so that our love of neighbour, as indeed all our love, might be brought back 
to God. We treated these precepts in the preceding book, when we discussed realities 
(res). It is therefore necessary that anyone find first in the Scriptures that, since one is 
entangled with the love of this age (that is, of temporal realities, res), one is far sepa-
rated from the love of God and of neighbour which alone Scripture prescribes. Then, 
indeed, that fear, by which one knows the judgment of God, and that piety, by 
which only one is able both to believe and concede the authority of the holy books, 
drives one to bewail oneself. For this knowledge, scientia, of a good hope does not 
make one vaunt oneself, but makes one lament." 
7 De doctrina Christiana, II, vii, 10: impetrat séduits precibus consolationem dtvini 
adiutorii, ne desperatione frangatur, et esse incipit in quartogradu, hoc est fbrtitudinis, 
quo esuritur et sititur institut. Hoc enttn affectu ab omni mortifèra iucunditate rerum 
transeuntium sese extrahit et inde se avertens convertit ad dilectionem aeternorum, incom-
mutabtlem scilicet unitatem eandemque trinitatetn O n e procures by zealous prayers 
the consolation of the Divine Help, lest one be broken by desperation, and ascends 
to the fourth step,gradus, that is, to courage, fortitudo. In this step one hungers and 
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thirsts after justice, iustitia. For in this step, one disentangles oneself from every 
deadly pleasure of transitory realities, res, and, averting oneself from these, returns, 
convertit, to the love of eternal things, to wit, the Immutable Unity, which is, at the 
same time, Trinity.11 
8 De doctrina Christiana, I, v, 5: Res igitur, quitus fruendum est, pater et ftUus et 
spiritus sanctus eademque trinitas, una quaedem summa res communisque omnibus fruen-
tibus ea, si tarnen res et non rerum omnia causa, si tarnen et causa "The reality, res, there-
fore, which ought to be enjoyed, fruendum, is the Father, the Son, and the Holy 
Ghost, and the same Trinity, the one highest reality, common to all who enjoy Him; 
if, indeed, He is a reality, and not the cause of all realities, rerum omnium causa, and 
even if He is the cause." 
9 H.-I. Marrou, who argues that the De doctrina Christiana represents a "redemp-
tion" of pagan literary culture for the Christian, describes the Prooemium as "une pré-
face polémique à justifier par avance son enterprise, à répondre à des opposants qui 
précisément estimaient une telle culture inutile au chrétien" (p. 389). Eugene Kevane 
argues that the preface is addressed to members of the African church, "persons of 
[Augustine's] own day ... [who will] disagree with his approach and attack it," who 
represent (in the tradition of Tertullian) a definite anti-paideia, "although Augustine 
does not name them" (p. 162). Kannengiesser, on the other hand, argues expressly 
against Kevane that "[f|ar from fighting here an 'anti-paideia' current, deeply rooted 
in the African church, Augustine addresses contemporary fellow Christians who 
know very well what a consistent interpretation of Scripture means.... Fighting 
against [those who are experienced interpreters of Scripture], he nevertheless realizes 
that 'they are already equipped to expound the sacred books.'" Moreover, Kanneng-
iesser argues that Augustine's tertiumgenus of objectors might represent the sort of 
interpreter epitomised in Tychonius Afer—that perhaps the Prooemium is addressed 
at Tychonius himself, or was at least composed in light of Augustine's first reading of 
the Liber regularis (p. 7). 
10 On a similar point, cf. the comments of Mark Jordan: "To become redemp-
tively manifest in human life, the Word takes flesh. Just so, thought takes on word-
sounds in order to be spoken and heard. In the same way, again, the continuity of 
knowledge about God requires a 'fleshly1 community within which it can become 
active. To put the proportion perhaps too naively: what the assumed human person 
is to the Son, that the spoken word is to the inner word of thought, and that the 
believing community is to the context of revelation" (p. 179). 
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11 Frui is defined as amove inhaerere alicui propter se ipsum (I, iv, 4). 
12 Just as there are two moments within Christian fides (intellective and affec-
tive), so also in the conversio of the human soul there are two moments: the first, 
fides, is intellective and consists in a knowledge (which at first remains in its unde-
monstrated form) of one's proper end; the second moment, spes, is affective and it is 
this moment which allows the actual conversio or "movement" of the soul to God 
through consummating Love. 
13 Augustine's use of Platonic philosophy is too large a question to deal with 
here. It is enough to remember two things. First, philosophy (which in Augustine's 
case is really a Christian Platonism) is the highest of the disciplines enumerated in De 
doctrina Christiana, book II. That is to say, the other disciplines are, as it were, ancil-
lae philosophiae—they are necessary for philosophy's activity, yet they find their true 
place only when aiming towards their consummation in philosophy, the highest sci-
ence. Secondly, Augustine places philosophy at the end of book Π because it is only 
through the realities discovered in Platonic philosophy (namely, the ideas and eternal 
reasons) that one can ascend, in book ΠΙ, ab inferioribus ad superiora. Perhaps the 
most helpful treatment of Augustine's use of Platonic philosophy is found in Crouse, 
"/» Aenigmate Trinitas," pp. 53-62. 
14 Cf. R.D. Crouse, "St Augustine's De Trinitate," pp. 501-510. 
15 Cf. Confessiones, X, i. 
16 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Π, I lae, 181, 3: Respondeo dicemdum 
quod actus doctrinae habet duplex obiectum: fit enirn doctrina per locutionem; locutio 
autem est signum audibile interioris conceptus. Est iqitur unumobiectum doctrinae id quod 
est materia Hve obiectum interioris conceptionis. Et quantum ad hoc obiectum, quandoque 
doctrina pertinet ad vitam activam, quandoque ad ritam contemplativam: ad activam 
quidem, quando homo interim concipit aliquam veritatem ut per earn in exteriori actione 
dirigatur; ad contemplativam autem, quando homo interius concipit aliquam veritatem 
intelliffibilern in cuius consideratione et atnore delectatur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro 
De verbis Dom.: Eltqant sibi partem melioretn, scilicet vitae contemplativae; vacent verbo, 
inhient doctrinae dulcendi, occupentur circa scientiam salutarem: ubi manifeste dicit doc-
trinam ad vitam conternplativam pertinere. Aliud obiectum doctrinae est ex parte sermonis 
audibilts. Et sic obiectum doctrinae est ipse audiens. Et quantum ad hoc obiectum, omnis 
doctrina pertinet ad vitam activam, ad quam pertinent exteriores actiones "I answer it 
must be said that the act of doctrina has a twofold object: for doctrina is performed 
through speech; but speech is the audible sign of an interior concept. Therefore, one 
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object of doctrina is the matter or die object of die interior concept. And so far as it is 
oriented towards this object, sometimes doctrina relates to the active life, and some-
times to the contemplative. Indeed, it relates to the active life when one interiorly 
conceives any truth such that through it he is directed to an exterior action; it relates 
to the contemplative life, however, when one interiorly conceives any intelligible 
truth in the contemplation and love of which he delights. Whence Augustine says in 
the book, De verbis dorn.: "He chose for himself the better part," namely the part of 
the contemplative life; "they will have time for the Word, they will gaze in wonder at 
the most sweet doctrine, they will be occupied with the saving knowledge." Here he 
manifesdy says that doctrina pertains to the contemplative life. The other object of 
doctrina is on the part of audible words. And thus the object of doctrina is the hearing 
itself. And inasmuch as it is directed towards this object, doctrina is related to the 
active life, to which exterior activities pertain." 
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